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Abstract
We analyze, using an standard OLG model with a non competitive
labour market, under which conditions a lower unemployment rate is as-
sociated with a higher unemployment benefit. We also study the dynamics
of growth and unemployment and we check if there is no relationship be-
tween growth and unemployment in the long run. The main results are:
1) If the government cares sufficiently about unemployed workers, then
a lower unemployment rate is associated with a higher unemployment
benefit. 2) The relationship between growth and unemployment in the
long run is weak in the sense that only the rate of growth of productivity
from all the parameters of the model affects both in the long run when
in wage setting process past wages and the present unemployment benefit
are taken into account.
Abstract
Analizamos, con un modelo de generaciones solapadas standard y mer-
cado de trabajo no competitivo, bajo que condiciones una tasa de paro
mas baja esta asociada con un subsidio de paro mas alto. Tambien es-
tudiamos la dinamica del crecimiento y el paro y comprobamos si en el
largo plazo estan relacionados. Los resultados principales son: 1) Si el
gobierno se preocupa lo suficientemente de los trabajadores desempleados
una tasa de paro mas baja esta asociada con un subsidio de paro mas
alto. 2) La relacion entre crecimiento y paro en el largo plazo es debil en
el sentido de que solo la tasa de crecimiento de la productividad, entre to-
dos los parametros del modelo, afecta a las dos variables en el largo plazo,
cuando en el proceso de determinacion de salarios se tienen en cuenta los
salarios pasados y presentes.
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1 Introduccion
The prevailing paradigm about the long run relationship between growth an
unemployment in the seventies comes from two independent models. On the one
hand, the Friedman-Phelps model which says that the economy in the long run
converges to a natural rate of unemployment which depends on the institutional
characteristics of the labour market. On the other hand, any of the growth
models of the decade (Solow, Infinite Horizon or OLG) with perfect competition
in the labor market, which say that, with an exogenous constant rate of labour
aumenting technological progress, the long run rate of growth depends on the
the exogenous rate of population growth and the exogenous rate of technological
progress. According to these results one may think that there is no relationship
between growth and unemployment in the long run, but this is an unwarranted
conclusion because these are two different models and the definition of long run
is also different.
In the eighties and the nineties this relationship has been analyzed by difer-
ent authors. Pissarides [8] in chapter 2 presents a model with matching frictions
in the labour market where growth, via the creation of more vacancies, has a
long run positive effect on employment (the capitalization effect), that is, a neg-
ative relationship between growth and unemployment in the long run. Aghion
and Howitt [1] add to this positive effect of growth on employment a nega-
tive one arguing that growth, via the increase in productivity, will increase the
inflow rate into unemployment (the reallocation effect). Considering together
these two effects they obtain a hump-shaped relationship between growth and
unemployment in the long run.
Bean and Pissarides [2], using an OLG model with also a labour market
with matching frictions and with a technology capable of yielding endogenous
unbounded growth (Romer [10]), analyze how the rate of growth and the rate
of unemployment in the short run change when there is a change in hiring costs,
in taxes, in the propensity to consume and in the relative bargaining strengh of
workers. This model ignores these causality effects of growth on unemployment
and growth and unemployment are jointly determined endogenous variables that
depend on exogenous variables. The results are that a reduction in hiring cost
and a decreases in taxes implies more growth and less unemployment, an increase
in the propensity to consume lowers the rate of growth and leaves unemployment
unaffected and an increase in the bargaining strenght of workers has ambiguos
effect on growth and unemployment. Using the same technology but in a union-
monopoly model (McDonald and Solow [6]) Daveri and Tabellini [3] get that
an increase in labour taxes implies less growth and more unemployment.
In the model presented in this paper we also follow the union-monopoly
model but, different from the Daveri and Tabellini’s paper, we endogenize the
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behaviour of the government which allows to study a comparative static ques-
tion not analyzed in the literature: how a government that cares more about
employed workers affects the equilibrium of the economy and, consequently, un-
der which conditions there is lower unemployment with a higher unemployment
benefit. On the other hand, we do not take into account the aggregate capital
externality of the Romer’s model (Romer [10]) and we allow for a constant
exogenous rate of productivity in order to clarify its effect on the long run rate
of growth and unemployment. Finally, we introduce the possibility of taking
into account past wages in the wage setting process and, as we will see, this has
a significative effect on the long run rate of growth and unemployment. This is
one of the main contributions of this paper. This purpouse has determined our
option for the union-monopoly model instead of the matching model, more suit-
able for analizing the effect of the destruction of jobs due to the technological
progress on growth and unemployment.
That a higher exogenous unemployment benefit is associated with more un-
employment is one of the standard results of partial equilibrium static models
with unions (see Oswald [7] and Layard, Nickell and Jackman [5]). Sorolla-i-
Amat [11] presents a general equilibrium static model where a higher exogenous
unemployment benefit implies more unemployment. In Sorolla-i-Amat [12] the
same result is presented using an infinite horizon model. In the present paper
the unemployment benefit is endogenous. On the one hand, it is true that, if
the government increases the unemployment benefit, the union asks for a higher
wage and there is more unemployment, but, on the other hand, if there is less
unemployment, then the government can pay a higher unemployment benefit
and the final relationship depends on both effects.
There are other papers that study similar questions using dynamic models
with wage setting. Przeworski and Wallerstein [9] and Sorolla-i-Amat [12]
analyze with an infinite horizon model what is the effect of a more proworker
government on the unemployment level. The main difference between both
papers is that in Sorolla-i-Amat’s paper the economy is a market economy.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the individual
agents: firms and consumers and we define the market equilibrium for a given
wage. Section 3 presents the collective agents: the union and the government.
Section 4 defines the Nash equilibrium of the economy and shows under which
conditions a higher unemployment benefit is associated with a lower unemploy-
ment rate. Section 5 analyzes the behaviour of wages, growth and unemploy-
ment in two special cases: In the first case, the union takes into account only
previous wages in the wage setting process. In the second case only present vari-
ables are considered by the union. Section 6 studies the long run rate of growth
and unemployment when the union weights the previous wage and the present
unemployment benefit when setting the wage. Last section is a summary of the
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results. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The Individual Agents
2.1 The Firm
There is only one firm with Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α;
where 0 < α < 1, Yt is output in period t, Kt is the capital stock in period t, Lt
is employment in period t, At is ”knowlegde” or the ”productivity of labour” in
period t and t = 0, 1,2, .... We assume that At changes according to the equation
At+1 = (1 + g)At where g is the rate of growth of productivity. Output and
capital are the same produced good, and capital in period t is the output saved
in period t-1. For simplicity we assume complete depreciation of the stock of
capital. The real wage in period t is denoted by wt and the rate of interest in
period t by Rt. The firm maximizes profits every period. The formal program
is the following:
Program Ft: Given wt, Rt, choose Kt and Lt in order to maximize:
Kαt (AtLt)
1−α − (1 + Rt)Kt − wtLt.
As it is well known, the zero profits condition implies a relationship between
the rate of interest and the real wage given by:
1 + Rt = R˜(wt) = α[
wt
(1 − α)At ]
α−1
α . (1)
If the zero profits condition holds then the relationship between the demand
of capital, Kdt , and the demand of labor, L
d
t , is given by the optimal capi-
tal/effective labor ratio function kdt =
Kdt
AtLdt
and, if the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, kdt is given by:
kdt = k˜(wt) = [
wt
(1− α)At ]
1
α ; (2)
The function R˜(wt) is called the factor-price frontier (see Diamond [4]). The
function k˜(wt) gives the optimal capital/effective labor ratio for a given wage. It
is easy to check that R˜′ < 0 and k˜′ > 0, which means that if the wage increases
the rate of interest decreases and the capital effective labor ratio increases, i.e,
the technology becomes mores capital intensive. We call to the term wtAt the
wage per unit of effective labour and we denote it by ωt. The output supply in
period t is denoted by Y st .
4
2.2 The Individuals
We follow an standard overlappping generation model (Diamond [4]). There
are Nt individuals born in period t. Population growths at rate n, thus Nt =
(1 + n)Nt−1, individuals live for two periods and, then, at time t there are Nt
individuals in the first period of their lives and Nt−1 individuals in the second
period of their lives.
When young, each individual supplies inellastically one unit of labor and
divides his income, I1,t, between consumption and saving. When old, the indi-
vidual consumes the saving and any interest he or she earns. In period zero a
generation of old people provides, as saving, the quantity of K0 units of capital.
We denote the consumption in period t of young and old individuals as C1,t and
C2,t respectively, thus, the utility of an individual born in period t, Ut depends
on C1,t and C2,t+1. The saving in period t of a young individual is denoted by
S1,t. The program of an individual born in period t is the following:
Program Ct: Given wt and Rt+1, choose C1,t, S1,t and C2,t+1 in order to
maximize:
Ut(C1,t, C2,t+1) = logC1,t +
1
1 + ρ
logC2,t+1;
subject to:
C1,t + S1,t = I1,t;
C2,t+1 = (1 + Rt+1)S1,t.
The solution to program Program Ct gives the optimal demand function of
good in period t and period t + 1 and the optimal supply of saving. With a
logarithmic utility function the optimal saving does not depen on Rt+1 and the
saving function, S˜s1,t(It), is:
S˜s1,t(It) =
I1,t
2 + ρ
= cI1,t; (3)
where c = 12+ρ is the saving’s propensity.
We assume that an individual born in period t, who supplies one unit of
labor, can be either employed or unemployed. If employed, his income It is
equal to the net real wage after taxes (1 − τt)wt, where τt is the tax rate on
an employed worker in period t. If unemployed, his income is equal to the
unemployment benefit in period t st. The saving of an employed in period t,
S˜sw,t((1− τt)wt), and the saving of an unemployed, S˜su,t(st), are given by:
S˜sw,t((1− τt)wt) = c(1− τt)wt ; S˜su,t(st) = cst. (4)
Old people are not taxed, thus the consumption of an old who was employed
in period t is (1 + Rt+1)c(1− τt)wt and the consumption of an old unemployed
in period t is (1 + Rt+1)cst.
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2.3 Equilibrium in the Input Markets
Now we define the effective quantity of labor employed in period t as Let =
min(Ldt , Nt). Then unemployment in period t is given by Nt −Let and the rate
of employment in period t, ut, by
Nt−Let
Nt
.
We define the aggregate saving supply in period t-1, Sst−1, as:
Sst−1 = S˜
s
w,t−1((1− τt−1)wt−1)Let−1 + S˜su,t−1(st−1)(Nt−1 − Let−1). (5)
Recall that aggregate saving in period t-1 is equal to the supply of capital in
period t, Kst . Thus, we have K
s
0 = K0 and K
s
t = S
s
t−1 for all t ≥ 1.
Using ( 4) and ( 5) we have that for all t ≥ 1:
Kst = K˜
s
t (wt−1, τt−1, st−1, L
e
t−1, Nt−1) =
c((1− τt−1)wt−1Let−1 + st−1(Nt−1 − Let−1)) . (6)
Equation ( 6) says that the supply of capital in period t, that is, the supply
of saving in period t-1, is equal to aggregate labour income times the saving’s
propensity.
We assume that the interest rate in period t, R∗t , balances demand and
supply in at least one of the inputs markets, that is:
Definition 2.3.1 Given wt−1, Let−1 and wt; R
∗
t is such that:
Kdt = K˜
s
t (wt−1, τt−1, st−1, L
e
t−1, Nt−1) (7)
and
Ldt ≤ Nt; (8)
or
Ldt = Nt (9)
and
Kdt ≤ K˜st (wt−1, τt−1, st−1, Let−1, Nt−1). (10)
Equations ( 7) and ( 8) say that the capital market is in equilibrium and
that there is an excess supply of labor. Equations ( 9) and ( 10) that the labor
market is in equilibrium and that there is an excess supply of capital.
The equilibrium interest rate, R∗t , the competitive wage, w
c
t , the inputs’
demand functions and the effective quantity of labor employed are given by the
following proposition:
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Proposition 2.3.1 Given wt−1, τt−1, st−1, Let−1, Nt−1 and wt; 1 + R
∗
t =
R˜(wt). Moreover there exists w
c
t = (1−α)(At)1−α[S
s
t−1
Nt
]α such that: If wt > w
c
t
then:
Kdt = K˜
s
t (.) = S
s
t−1 (11)
and
Let = L
d
t =
Kdt
Atk˜(wt)
=
At
1−α
α Sst−1
[ wt1−α ]
1
α
< Nt. (12)
If wt = w
c
t then:
Kdt = K˜
s
t (wt−1, L
e
t−1) = S
s
t−1 (13)
and
Let = L
d
t = Nt. (14)
If wt < w
c
t then:
Let = L
d
t = Nt (15)
and
Kdt = AtL
d
t k˜(wt) =
Nt
At
1−α
α
[
wt
1− α ]
1
α < K˜st (.). (16)
Proposition 2.3.1 says that the equilibrium interest rate is given by the zero
profits condition 1 + R∗t = R˜(wt). Moreover, if the wage is greater than the
competitive wage, the capital market is in equilibrium, the effective quantity of
labor employed is given by the labor demand ( 12) and there is always unem-
ployment. In this case, if the wage in period t increases then the labor demand
in period t decreases. This may seem strange because we are in the particular
case in which saving do not depend on the interest rate. The explanation is that
an increase in the wage switches to a more capital intensive technique and labor
is reduced. This fact can be seen in equation ( 12) where Kdt does not depend on
Rt but if wt increases then k˜(wt) decreases. Note also that the elasticity labor
demand is − 1α < −1, and, thus, the wage bill before taxes wtLdt (.) decreases
when wt increases.
If the capital market is in equilibrium one can show that the output market
is in equilibrium and then aggregate output in period t, Yt, is given by:
Yt = Y
s
t =
Sst−1
[ wtAt(1−α) ]
1−α
α
=
At
1−α
α Sst−1
[ wt1−α ]
1−α
α
. (17)
In this case the elasticity of output with respect to the wage is − 1−αα , that
is, in order to increase aggregate employment by the percentage of 1α aggregate
output must increase by the percentage of 1−αα (Okun’s Law).
Finally, if the wage is less than the competitive wage, the labor market is
in equilibrium and there is an excess supply of capital. In this last case, we
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have an excess supply of agregate savings, which means that young individuals
must save less and consume more. Thus, in order to be rigurous, we should
specify how to raction saving in this situation. Nevertheless, we omit this point
because, as we will see in the next section, this situation never holds.
3 The Collective Agents
3.1 The Union
In each period t there is one union that sets the wage taking into account
that it will affect the effective quantity of labor employed in the way described
by proposition 2.3.1. We assume that the union cares about employment and
compares the wage in period t with the wage obtained in period t-1 and with the
unemployment benefit obtained in period t. These assumptions are formalized
by the following program:
Program Ut: Given wt−1, τt−1, st−1, Let−1, Nt−1, τt and st choose, wt in
order to maximize:
St = ((1− τt)wt − γt(1− τt−1)wt−1 − (1− γt)st)Let .
Note from the objective function of the union, St, that the higher the wage
after taxes in period t, the higher the welfare of the union. The parameter γt
weights the way in which the wage after taxes of the previous period and the
unemployment benefit are compared with the wage after taxes of the period.
We assume that 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1. If γt = 1 the union compares the wage after
taxes of the period only with the wage after taxes of the previous period. If
γt = 0 the union compares the wage after taxes of the period only with the
unemployment benefit. When γt increases the unemployment benefit weights
less in the comparison. The effective quantity of labor employed appears as a
factor in St meaning that if employment increases, the welfare of the union also
increases.
The motivation for this apparently ad hoc utility function is the following:
In the two extreme cases the union compares the wage after taxes of the period
either with the wage after taxes of the previous period or with the unemployment
benefit of the period. The assumption that 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1 is because we think that
both parameters play an important role in the wage setting process. In other
words, we think the when unions (workers) set wages they take into account
past wages and the current unemployment benefit. We use the simplest utility
funtion that reflects this comparison where γt gives the weight given to past
wages and the unemployment benefit. Note also that when γt = 1 the union
maximizes the increase in wages after taxes of all employed workers and when
γt = 0 the union maximizes the wedge times employment. The solution obtained
in this last case is the same than the solution obtained if the union maximizes
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either the expected income of the worker or the sum of all workers income,
which are the most common utility functions used for unions. The solution to
Program Ut is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1.1 There exists w¯t ≥ 0 such that if wct < w¯t then
wt =
γt(1− τt−1)wt−1 + (1− γt)st
(1− α)(1− τt) > w
c
t . (18)
If wct ≥ w¯t and γt = 1 then wt = wct . If wct ≥ w¯t and 0 ≤ γt < 1 then there
exists s¯t ≥ 0 such that if st > s¯t then
wt =
γt(1− τt−1)wt−1 + (1− γt)st
(1− α)(1− τt) > w
c
t ; (19)
and if st ≤ s¯t then wt = wct .
Proposition 3.1.1 gives the best reply function of the union which is denoted
by: w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, τt, st, γt). Proposition 3.1.1 says that if the competitive wage
is low enough then the union always sets a wage that implies unemployment. If
the competitive wage is high and γt = 1 the union always sets the competitive
wage. If the competitive wage is high and 0 ≤ γt < 1, then there are low values
of the unemployment benefit where the union sets the competitive wage. It is
easy to check from equations ( 18) and ( 19) that, if there is unemployment, w˜t
is increasing in τt and when 0 ≤ γt < 1 it is increasing in st. Note also that
if γt = 1 and τt−1 = τt then wt =
wt−1
(1−α) that is, the growth rate of the real
wage is given by: 1(1−α) − 1. If γt = 0 then wt = st(1−α)(1−τt) . In this last case
if st = (1− α)(1 − τt)wt−1 then we have wt = wt−1, that is, real wage rigidity
along time. We have also real wage rigidity in this case if st and τt are constant
over time.
3.2 The Government
We assume that if there is unemployment in period t the government sets the
tax rate and the unemployment benefit in order to maximize a utility function
that depends on the income of employed and unemployed workers. We assume
also that the government balances its budget at period t.
The formal program of the government is the following:
Program Gt: Given wt > w
c
t and L
e
t , choose τt and st in order to maximize:
Gt = ((1− τt)wtLet )βt(st(Nt − Let ))1−βt ,
subject to:
st(Nt − Let ) = τtwtLet .
We assume, then, that the government maximizes a social welfare function
that depends on the income of people affected by its actions. This utility func-
tion is similar to the used in the standard social planner program where the
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social planner maximizes also the utility of a representative agent. Because in
this model we have heterogeneity of workers (employed and unemployed) the
income of both appears in the utility function. We use as argument income
instead of utility (log of income) because it simplies the solution. The param-
eter βt weights the welfare of employed and unemployed workers in the utility
function of the government. If βt increases we say that the government becomes
more proemployed workers. We assume that 0 ≤ βt ≤ 1. Note that the income
of the old people in period t, (1 + Rt)cwt−1Let−1, do not appear in the utility
function of the government. This is because we assume that the government
only cares for the welfare of the people affected by its actions when there is
unemployment. However, one can check, that the solution of the government’s
program will not change if we introduce this term as a factor.
The approach of the social welfare function for the government with different
weights has been used in other models with heterogeinity of agents (Przeworski
and Wallerstein [9]). The other alternative standard approach, not followed in
this paper, is to assume that the government represents the median voter.
It is easy to check that the solution to Program Gt is given by:
τt = 1− βt, (20)
and
st =
(1 − βt)wtLet
Nt − Let
. (21)
If there is full employment the government does nothing, which means τt = 0
and st = 0.
Note that the government decides both the tax rate and the unemployment
benefit and its optimal choice implies a constant tax rate and the amount of
the unemployment benefit changes depending on the amount of employment.
How the unemployment benefit is set is really important and it will affect the
dynamics of the model. Other assumptions used in the literature is to set
the unemployment benefit proportional to wages (z = λw, Pissarides [8]) or
proportional to aggregate output ( s = σy, Daveri and Tabellini [3]).
The behaviour of the government is expressed by the best reply functions of
the government, τ˜t(wt, βt) and s˜t(wt, βt). Note that, if there is unemployment,
the taxe rate does not depend on the wage and that it is decreasing in β. The
variable decided by the government that depend on the wage is the unemploy-
ment benefit. It is easy to check that s˜t is decreasing in wt and βt. Note also,
from ( 21), that when there is few unemployment, the unemployment benefit is
really big, thus, it can be the case, that the real wage after taxes is less than
10
the unemployment benefit. This unpleasant characteristic can be eliminated
introducing in the program of the government the constraint (1 − τt)wt ≥ st.
For simplicity when proving the existence of equilibrium in the next section, we
do not introduce this contraint in program Gt.
If the government has a balanced budget constraint and the wage in period
t is greater than the competitive wage then, using ( 12) the effective quantity
of labor employed is given by:
Let =
cwt−1Let−1
At[
wt
At(1−α) ]
1
α
=
c(1− α) 1α (wt−1At−1 )Let−1
(1 + g)(wtAt )
1
α
=
At
1−α
α cwt−1Let−1
[ wt1−α ]
1
α
< Nt. (22)
If there is unemployment in periods t − 1 and t it is easy to compute that
the rate of growth output in period t, yt =
Yt−Yt−1
Yt−1
, the rate of growth of
employment in period t, lt =
Let−Let−1
Let−1
and the rate of unemployment, ut, are
given by:
yt =
c(1− α) 1α
(wtAt )
1−α
α
− 1 = cA
1−α
α
t (1 − α)
1
α
w
1−α
α
t
− 1. (23)
lt =
c(1− α) 1α (wt−1At−1 )
(1 + g)(wtAt )
1
α
− 1 = cA
1−α
α
t (1 − α)
1
αwt−1
w
1
α
t
− 1. (24)
ut = 1−
At
1−α
α cwt−1Let−1
Nt[
wt
(1−α) ]
1
α
. (25)
Note that, from equations ( 23),( 24) and ( 25), if wt increases then yt and
lt decrease and ut increases. Note in fact that the evolution of the output
growth rate is given by the evolution of the wage per unit of effective labor. If
the wage per unit of effective labor increases along time the rate of growth of
output decreases. Note also that if the saving propensity increases, both the
output growth rate and the unemployment rate decreases. Note, finally, that
an increase in the supply of labor, Nt, increases the unemployment rate but, if
there is unemployment, do not affect the rate of growth of output.
4 Nash Equilibrium
Definition 4.1 Given wt−1, τt−1, γt, and βt; w∗t , τ
∗
t and s
∗
t is an Nash Equi-
librium if
w∗t = w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, τ
∗
t , s
∗
t , γt); (26)
τ∗t = τ˜t(w
∗
t , βt); (27)
s∗t = s˜t(w
∗
t , βt). (28)
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Theorem 4.1 There exists w′t and w”t such that if w
c
t < w
′
t then an equilibrium
with unemployment always exists and it is unique.
If γt = 1 and w
′
t ≤ wct < w”t there exists an equilibrium with unemployment
and an equilibrium with full employment, if w”t ≤ wct there exists a unique
equilibrium with full employment.
If 0 ≤ γt < 1 and w′t ≤ wct there exists an equilibrium with unemployment
and an equilibrium with full employment.
The representation of these situations are given by Figures 1.a, 1.b and
2.a, 2.b and 2.c. We denote the equilibrium with unemployment as w∗t,u =
wˆt(wt−1, τt−1, γt, βt), τ∗t,u = τt(βt), and s
∗
t,u = sˆt(wt−1, τt−1, γt, βt). The special
case γt = 1 is analyzed in the next section. When 0 ≤ γt < 1 we can prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 Comparative Statics. The sign of the equilibrium partial deriva-
tives is given by the following table:
If ut <
1−βt
α then:
∂wˆt
∂βt
< 0 ∂τ˜t∂βt < 0
∂sˆt
∂βt
> 0 .
If ut >
1−βt
α then:
∂wˆt
∂βt
< 0 ∂τ˜t∂βt < 0
∂sˆt
∂βt
< 0 .
If (1− τt)wt−1 > st then:
∂wˆt
∂γt
> 0 ∂τ˜t∂γt = 0
∂sˆt
∂γt
< 0 .
If (1− τt)wt−1 < st then:
∂wˆt
∂γt
< 0 ∂τ˜t∂γt = 0
∂sˆt
∂γt
> 0 .
The interpretation of Theorem 4.2 is the following. First, the more proem-
ployed workers the government the lower the equilibrium wage and, by ( 23)
and ( 25), the higher the output growth rate and the lower the unemployment
rate. Second, if the unemployment rate is low enough, ut <
1−βt
α , then the more
proemployed workers the government the higher the unemployment benefit, that
is, we will have more employment and a higher unemployment benefit with a
more proemployed workers government. Note that the unemployment rate de-
pends on βt, this means that, in principle, we can not say when this situation
happens. A sufficient condition is to have 1−βtα > 1, that is, βt < 1 − α. We
can interpret this result as follows: if the government is really prounemployed
workers and it becomes more proemployed workers the economy will have less
unemployment and a higher unemployment benefit, that is, if the government
cares sufficiently about unemployed workers a lower unemployment rate is asso-
ciated with a higher unemployment benefit. Finally, if the real wage after taxes
of the previous period is greater that the unemployment benefit of the period
the higher the union cares about the wage of the previous period the higher
the equilibrium wage rate and the unemployment rate and the lower the growth
rate and the unemployment benefit.
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5 Special Cases
In general it is not possible to compute the equilibrium w∗t,u, τ
∗
t,u and s
∗
t,u except
in the special cases: γt = 1 and βt = β for all t, and γt = 0, βt = β for all t.
These two extreme cases have an easy interpretation. In the first case, γt = 1
and βt = β for all t, the union only takes into account the wage after taxes of
the previous period, when setting the wage. In the second case the union only
takes into account the unemployment benefit of the period. In both cases the
government gives always the same weight to the welfare of employed workers.
When γt = 1 and βt = β for all t we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1 There exists N¯t such that if Nt > (≤)N¯t then there exists
a unique equilibrium with unemployment (full employment) in period t and
w∗t−w∗t−1
w∗t−1
= α1−α . If there is unemployment in each period t (Nt > N¯t for
all t) and g < α1−α , the rate of growth of output, yt, and the rate of growth
of employment, lt, decrease with time and there is some period t
′ such that for
all t ≥ t′ the rate of unemployment, ut, increases. If g = α1−α , yt and lt are
constant. If lt < n then ut increases with time. If lt = n then ut is constant. If
lt > n then ut decreases. If g >
α
1−α , yt and lt increase with time and there is
some period t” such that for all t ≥ t′ the rate of unemployment, ut, decreases.
Proposition 5.1 says that if the rate of growth of wages is less than the rate
of productivity growth then there is an increase in the rates of growth of output
and employment and the rate of unemployment decreases after some time. This
condition implies that the rate of growth of the wage per unit of effective labour
is negative, that is, the wage per unit of effective labor decreases with time. The
bad situation is when the rate of growth of wages is greater than the rate of
productivity growth, i. e. when the wage per unit of effective labour increases,
in this case growth decreases and unemployment increases. From the proof of
proposition 5.1 it is easy to see that we can have situations with a positive rate
of growth of output and a negative rate of growth of employment.
When γt = 0 and βt = β for all t, we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2 If γt = 0 and βt = β for all t there always exists an equi-
librium with unemployment and an equilibrium with full employment. The un-
employment rate at the equilibrium with unemployment is the same for all t
and is given by ut =
1−β
1−αβ . Moreover if there is always unemployment, the
wage per unit of effective labour, ω∗t =
wt
At
, and the unemployment benefit per
unit of effective labour, σ∗t =
st
At
, converge to a long run wage and unemploy-
ment benefit per unit of effective labour, ω∗L−R = (1−α)
1
1−α ( c(1+n)(1+g))
α
1−α and
σ∗L−R = β(1 − α)
2−α
1−α ( c(1+n)(1+g))
α
1−α , the long run rate of growth of output is
equal to (1 + n)(1 + g) − 1 and the long run rate of growth of employment is
equal to n.
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The interpretation of proposition 5.2 is, if the union only cares about the
unemployment benefit of the period, β remains constant along time and there is
always unemployment, the unemployment rate remains constant along time and
depends only on α and β. Note that the higher the β the lower the unemploy-
ment rate. The intuition for this result comes from the proof of 5.2. In this case
the wage is proportional to the unemployment benefit and the unemployment
benefit is proportional to the wage, which means the same equation in terms of
the rate of unemployment for all t.
Moreover, if the wage and the unemployment benefit per unit of effective
labour at period zero are lower (higher) than the long run wage and the un-
employment benefit per unit of effective labour they increase (decrease) along
time. The rate of growth of wages and the unemployment benefit in the long
run is equal to g. The long-run rate of growth is equal to (1 + n)(1 + g) − 1
and the long run rate of unemployment is equal to 1−β1−αβ , that is, there is no
relationship between growth and unemployment in the long run. Note that in
this specific OLG model when the labour market is competitive the long-run
rate of growth is also equal to (1 +n)(1 + g)− 1. This is not surprising because
the constant rate of unemployment implies that the effective quantity of labour
employed growths at the constant rate n and, then, the analysis of the model is
identically to the case of perfect competition.
Thus, the behaviour of the economic variables of this OLG model along
time when the labour market is not competitive really depends on the specific
wage setting. We want also to emphasize that the specific behaviour of the
government is also important for the results obtained. Let’s now, alternativelly,
assume that the government is commited to pay a given unemployment benefit
s′ constant along time and this quantity is provided taxing both employed and
unemployed workers at the same tax rate τt. In this case the government has no
choice, given the wage and the unemployment benefit, and, it only determines
τt in order to balance its budget. On the other hand, the utility function of the
union, if the unemployed workers are also taxed, changes to
S′t = ((1− τt)wt − γt(1− τt−1)wt−1 − (1 − γt)(1− τt)s′)Let .
If γt = 0 for all t, it is easy to check, using the proof of proposition 3.1.1, that, if
there is unemployment, wt =
s′
(1−α) , for all t, that is, there is real wage rigidity
along time. It is also easy to check, using equations ( 23) and ( 24), that the
rates of growth of output and employment increase.
Note then that, depending on the assumptions about the specific wage set-
ting process and the behaviour of the government, we have obtained the fol-
lowing special cases: 1) Constant rate of growth of the real wage with rates of
growth of output and employment increasing or decreasing depending on the
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rate of growth of productivity. 2) Constant rate of unemployment with real
wage per unit of effective labour increasing or decreasing to a long run wage
and with the rate of growth of output increasing or decreasing to (1 +n)(1 + g)
(a case similar to the same OLG model with perfect competition in the labor
market). 3) Real wage rigidity with increasing rates of growth of output and
employment with time. These special cases show that the dynamics of this OLG
model with a non competitive labour market may be very different depending
on the assumptions about the specific wage setting process and the behaviour
of the government.
6 The Case 0 < γ < 1.
If γt = γ, βt = β for all t, 0 < γ < 1 and we assume that there is always
unemployment substituting ( 21) in ( 18) on the one hand and taking equation
( 22) on the other we have the equilibrium wage and the effective quantity
of labour employed are given by the following system of non linear first order
difference equations:
w∗t =
γ
(1− α)w
∗
t−1 +
1− γ
(1− α)β
(1− β)w∗tLet
Nt −Let
(29)
Let =
At
1−α
α cw∗t−1L
e
t−1
[
w∗t
1−α ]
1
α
. (30)
Where the endogenous variables are Let and w
∗
t .
We can transform this system into the following non-linear first order system
of two difference equations in terms of the wage per unit of effective labour and
the rate of unemployment.
ω∗t =
γ
(1 − α)(1 + g)ω
∗
t−1 +
(1− γ)(1− β)
(1− α)β ω
∗
t [
1
ut
− 1] (31)
(1 − ut)(1 + n)
(1− ut−1) =
c(1 − α)1−αω∗t
(1 + g)(ω∗t )
1
α
. (32)
It is easy to compute that the steady state wage per unit of effective la-
bor and rate of unemployment are: ω∗ = (1 − α) 11−α ( c(1+n)(1+g))
α
1−α and u =
(1+g)(1−γ)(1−β)
(1+g)(1−γ)(1−β)+[(1+g)(1−α)−γ]β . Analyzing the linearized system around the
steady-state we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6.1 There exists γ′ such that if γ < γ′ then the linearized system
converges to ω∗ and u.
In this case it is easy to see that the long run unemployment rate is less than
one and that decreases with g and β. It increases with γ if and only if g < α1−α .
15
Note that the long run wage per unit of effective labour is the same that the
one obtained in the case γ = 0 which means that the long run rate of output
growth is equal to (1 +n)(1 + g)− 1. This means that, when both the previous
wage and the unemployment benefit are taken into account when setting the
wage, a change in either γ or β affects the long run rate of unemployment but
keeps the long run rate of growth of output unaffected, an increase in n increases
the rate of growth of output but keeps the rate of unemployment unaffected and
an increase in g increases the rate of growth of output and decreases the rate of
unemployment.
We can not conclude that there is no relationship between growth and un-
employment in the long run in this case because there is a common variable g
which affects both rates in the long run. The higher the rate of productivity
growth, the higher the growth rate and the lower the unemployment rate in the
long run, which implies an negative relationship between growth and unemploy-
ment in the long run. Note that this happens only when previous wages are
taken into account when setting the wage. The intuition is that, in this case,
the same real wage is set independently of the rate of productivity and, then,
a change in g will affect employment. This result means that any government
policy that increases productivity will imply more growth and less unemploy-
ment. Note also that, contrary to Daveri and Tabellini’s result ( [3]), an increase
on workers’s tax rate (decrease in β) increases unemployment but keeps output
growth unaffected.
Note also that if g > α1−α and the economy converges to the steady state
the higher the γ the lower the unemployment rate which means that taking into
account only the unemployment benefit when setting the wage does not imply
the lowest unemployment rate.
7 Final Comments
Using an standard OLG model with a non competitive labour market, where
the wage is set by unions and the government pays an unemployment benefit
taxing workers, we have analyzed under which conditions a lower unemployment
rate is associated with a higher unemployment benefit. We have found that
this situation happens if the government cares sufficiently about unemployed
workers.
We have also analyzed the long run behaviour of real wages, the rates of
growth of ouput and the rate of unemployment in three cases. We have found
that, if the government sets both the unemployment benefit and the tax rate to
employed workers and workers take into account only present variables of the
period when setting the wage, the long run rate of growth depends on the rate
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of population growth and the rate of productivity growth. The rate of unem-
ployment is constant along time. This constant rate of unemployment depends
on how the government cares about the welfare of employed (or unemployed)
workers and on the parameter of the production function. We can conclude in
this case that there is no relationship between growth and unemployment in the
long run.
If the government sets both the unemployment benefit and the tax rate
to employed workers and workers take into account only previous wages when
setting the wage, the rate of growth of real wages is constant and depends
on the parameter of the production function. If it is smaller than the rate of
productivity growth, the rates of growth of output and employment increase
with time and, after some time, the rate of unemployment decreases.
Finally, when both previous wages and the present unemployment benefit
are taken into account when setting the wage, and the weight of previous wages
is small the economy converges to a long run rate of unemployment. The long
run rate of growth depends on the rate of population growth and the rate of
productivity growth. The long run rate of unemployment depends on the weight
of previous wages when setting the wage, on how the government cares about
the welfare of unemployed workers and on the rate of productivity growth. In
this case the higher the rate of productivity growth, the higher the growth rate
and the lower the unemployment rate in the long run. Last result means that
any government policy that increases productivity will imply more growth and
less unemployment.
Summarizing, we can not conclude that there is no relationship between
growth and unemployment in the long-run because this only happens when the
government sets both the unemployment benefit and the tax rate to employed
workers and workers take into account only the unemployment benefit of the
period when setting the wage. If it turns out that past wages are a relevant
variable in the wage setting process the higher the rate of growth of productivity
the higher the rate of growth and the lower the rate of unemployment in the long
run, which implies a negative relationship between growth and unemployment.
Nevertheless this relationship is weak because growth and unemployment in the
long run are also affected independently by many other exogenous variables.
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A Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. 1 We know that if 1 + Rt = R˜(wt) then Y
s
t =
F (Kdt , AtL
d
t ) and
Kdt
AtLdt
= k˜(wt). The competitive wage, w
c
t , implies:
Kdt = K
s
t and L
d
t = Nt, (33)
and, then, wct satisfies:
k˜(wct ) =
Kst
AtNt
. (34)
Substituting ( 2) and ( 6) in ( 34), and solving the equation for wct we obtain:
wct = (1− α)(At)1−α[S
s
t−1
Nt
]α.
If wt > w
c
t we obtain:
k˜(wt) =
Kdt
AtL
d
t
>
Kst
AtNt
=
Sst−1
AtNt
, (35)
because k˜(wt) is increasing in wt. If K
d
t = S
s
t−1, then, from ( 35), we obtain:
Ldt =
Kdt
Atk˜(wt)
=
At
1−α
α Sst−1
[
wt
1−α ]
1
α
< Nt. If, on the contrary, L
d
t = Nt, then, from
( 35), we have: Kdt = k˜(wt)AtNt > K
s
t .
If wt < w
c
t we have:
k˜(wt) =
Kdt
AtL
d
t
<
Kst
AtNt
=
Sst−1
AtNt
. (36)
If Ldt = Nt, then, from ( 36), we have: K
d
t = k˜(wt)AtNt = [
wt
1−α ]
1
α
Nt
At
1−α
α
< Kst .
If, on the contrary, Kdt = S
s
t−1, then, from ( 36), we obtain: L
d
t =
Kdt
Atk˜(wt)
> Nt.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. 1 First note that the wage set by the union will
never be lower than the competitive wage. From proposition 2.3.1, if wt < w
c
t
then Let = Nt. Thus setting the wage equal to the competitive wage we still have
Let = Nt and a greater wage. Now we solve the program of the union assuming
that Let =
At
1−α
α Sst−1
[
wt
1−α ]
1
α
. It is easy to show that the wt that maximizes the program
of the union is the wage that maximizes the function:
S′t = ((1− τt)wt − ht)w−
1
α
t ; (37)
where ht = γt(1−τt−1)wt−1+(1−γt)st. The first order condition for a maximum
of S′t is:
(1− τt) − 1
α
(1− τt)wt − ht
wt
= 0. (38)
Solving ( 38) for wt we obtain:
wt =
ht
(1− α)(1− τt) =
γt(1− τt−1)wt−1 + (1− γt)st
(1− α)(1− τt) . (39)
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Now, wt > w
c
t implies, using ( 39):
γt(1− τt−1)wt−1 + (1− γt)st
(1− α)(1− τt) > (1− α)(At)
1−α[
Sst−1
Nt
]α. (40)
If γt = 1 inequality 40 becomes:
wct <
(1 − τt−1)wt−1
(1− α)(1− τt) = w¯t. (41)
If 0 ≤ γt < 1 solving 40 for st we obtain:
st >
(1− α)2(1− τt)(At)1−α[S
s
t−1
Nt
]α − γt(1− τt−1)wt−1
(1 − γt) = s¯t. (42)
Thus, if st > s¯t we have: wt =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1+(1−γt)st
(1−α)(1−τt) > w
c
t . If st ≤ s¯t then we
have Let = Nt in which case wt = w
c
t . Finally we compute when s¯t < 0. From
( 42) this inequality holds if and only if:
wct <
γt(1− τt−1)wt−1
(1− α)(1− τt) = w¯t. (43)
Note from ( 41) and ( 43) that w¯t ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 4. 1 First we compute the best reply function of the union
when τt = 1 − βt. Using the proof of proposition 3.1.1 we obtain: If wct <
w”t =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1
(1−α)βt then wt =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1+(1−γt)st
(1−α)βt > w
c
t . If w
c
t ≥ w”t
and γt = 1 then wt = w
c
t . If w
c
t ≥ w”t and 0 ≤ γt < 1 then there ex-
ists s”t =
(1−α)βtwct−γt(1−τt−1)wt−1
(1−γt) ≥ 0 such that if st > s”t then wt =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1+(1−γt)st
(1−α)βt > w
c
t and if st ≤ s”t then wt = wct . We denote this
best reply function of the union as w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, 1− βt, st, γt).
Now we compute the best reply function of the union when τt = 0. Using the
proof of proposition 3.1.1 we obtain: If wct < w
′
t =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1
(1−α) then wt =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1+(1−γt)st
(1−α) > w
c
t . If w
c
t ≥ w′t and γt = 1 then wt = wct . If wct ≥ w′t
and 0 ≤ γt < 1 then there exists s′t = (1−α)w
c
t−γt(1−τt−1)wt−1
(1−γt) ≥ 0 such that if
st > s
′
t then wt =
γt(1−τt−1)wt−1+(1−γt)st
(1−α) > w
c
t and if st ≤ s′t then wt = wct . We
denote this best reply function of the union as w˜t(wt−1, τt−1,0, st, γt).
Functions w˜t(wt−1, τt−1,1−βt, st, γt) and w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, 0, st, γt) when γt =
1 and wct < w
′
t, w
′
t ≤ wct < w”t and w”t ≤ wct are represented in figures 1.a, 1.b
and 1.c respectively. Functions w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, 1−βt, st, γt) and w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, 0, st, γt)
when 0 ≤ γt < 1 and wct < w′t, w′t ≤ wct < w”t and w”t ≤ wct are represented
in figures 2.a, 2.b and 2.c respectively. On the other hand, we can also repre-
sent function s˜t in all figures. Looking at figure 1.a it is obvious that there is a
unique equlibrium with unemployment. Looking at figure 1.b there is an equilib-
rium with unemployment and an equilibrium with full employment. Looking at
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figure 1.c there is an equilibrium with full employment. Looking at figure 2.a it
is obvious that there is a unique equlibrium with unemployment. Looking at fig-
ures 2.b and 2.c there is an equilibrium with unemployment and an equilibrium
with full employment.
Proof of Theorem 4. 2 If there is unemployment, by 20, we have τ˜t(wt, βt) =
1−βt and then ∂τ˜t∂βt < 0 and
∂τ˜t
∂γt
= 0. We can then write the best reply function
of the union as: w˜t(wt−1, τt−1, βt, st, γt). By the implicit function theorem we
have: "
∂wˆt
∂γt
∂wˆt
∂βt
∂sˆt
∂γt
∂sˆt
∂βt
#
=
1
1− ∂w˜t∂βt
∂s˜t
∂wt
"
∂w˜t
∂γt
∂w˜t
∂βt
+ ∂w˜t∂st
∂s˜t
∂βt
∂s˜t
∂wt
∂w˜t
∂γt
∂s˜t
∂wt
∂w˜t
∂βt
+ ∂s˜t∂βt
#
. (44)
It is easy to prove that if (1− τt)wt−1 > (<)st then ∂w˜t∂γt > (<)0. We know that
∂w˜t
∂βt
< 0 and ∂w˜t∂st > 0. We also know that
∂s˜t
∂wt
< 0 and ∂s˜t∂βt < 0. Substituting the
sign of this partial derivatives in ( 44) in we obtain, when (1− τt)wt−1 > (<)st
the following matrix:
"
∂wˆt
∂γt
∂wˆt
∂βt
∂sˆt
∂γt
∂sˆt
∂βt
#
=
•
+(−) −
− ?
‚
. This means that, by the
sign of the partial derivatives, we do not know the sign of ∂sˆt∂βt . In order to have
these partial derivative positive, by ( 44), we need:
∂s˜t
∂wt
∂w˜t
∂βt
> − ∂s˜t
∂βt
. (45)
Computing the partial derivatives of ( 45) and substituting the labor demand
elasticity by − 1α we obtain:
(1− βt)Ldt α−1α (Nt − Ldt )− (1− βt) 1α(Ldt )2
(Nt −Ldt )2
(−wt
βt
) >
wtL
d
t
(Nt − Ldt )
. (46)
Simplifing ( 46) we obtain:
1−βt
βt
1−α
α wtL
d
t (Nt − Ldt ) + 1−βtαβt wt(Ldt )2
(Nt − Ldt )2
>
wtL
d
t
(Nt − Ldt )
. (47)
Inequality ( 47) is true if and only if (1 − βt)Ldt > (α + βt − 1)(Nt − Ldt ), that
is, if and only if: ut <
1−βt
α .
Proof of Proposition 5. 1 If βt = β for all t from the proof of theorem 4.1 we
have w′t = w”t =
wt−1
(1−α) . Then theorem 4.1 becomes: If w
c
t <
w∗t−1
(1−α) there exists
a unique equilibrium with unemployment. If wct ≥
w∗t−1
(1−α) there exists a unique
equilibrium with full employment. Finally, it is easy to check that wct <
w∗t−1
(1−α)
holds if and only if Nt >
cA
1−α
α
t (1−α)
2
α Let−1
(w∗t−1)
1−α
α
= N¯t. Note also that in period zero
we have w∗0 = w
c
0.
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If w∗t =
w∗t−1
(1−α) for all t solving this difference equation backwards we get:
w∗t =
w∗0
(1 − α)t . (48)
Subtituting At = A0(1 + g)
t and ( 48) in ( 23) we obtain:
yt =
c(1 − α) 1α
[
w∗0
A0
]
1−α
α
[(1 + g)(1− α)] 1−αα t − 1. (49)
If w∗t−1 = (1− α)w∗t then, using ( 24), lt becomes:
lt =
c(1 − α) 1+αα
(
w∗t
At
)
1−α
α
− 1 = cA
1−α
α
t (1− α)
1+α
α
w
∗ 1−αα
t
− 1. (50)
Subtituting At = A0(1 + g)
t and ( 48) in ( 50) we obtain:
lt =
c(1 − α) 1+αα
[
w∗0
A0
]
1−α
α
[(1 + g)(1− α)] 1−αα t − 1. (51)
We have that ut < (=)(>)ut−1 if and only if lt > (=)(<)n which becomes,
using ( 51):
c(1 − α) 1+αα
[
w∗0
A0
]
1−α
α
[(1 + g)(1− α)] 1−αα t − 1 > (=)(<)n. (52)
From ( 49) and ( 51) we have that yt and lt decrease if and only if [(1+g)(1−
α)]
1−α
α < 1 that is, if and only if g < α1−α . From ( 52) if
c(1−α)
1+α
α
[
w∗
0
A0
]
1−α
α
− 1 ≤ n we
have that ut increases for all t ≥ 0. If not there will exist some t > 0 such that
lt < n.
From ( 49) and ( 51) we have that yt and lt are constant if and only if [(1 +
g)(1−α)] 1−αα = 1 that is, if and only if g = α1−α . From ( 52) if c(1−α)
1+α
α
[
w∗
0
A0
]
1−α
α
−1 < n
then ut increases. If
c(1−α)
1+α
α
[
w∗
0
A0
]
1−α
α
−1 = n then ut is constant. If c(1−α)
1+α
α
[
w∗
0
A0
]
1−α
α
−1 > n
then ut decreases.
From ( 49) and ( 51) we have that yt and lt increase if and only if [(1+g)(1−
α)]
1−α
α > 1 that is, if and only if g > α1−α . From ( 52) if
c(1−α)
1+α
α
[
w∗
0
A0
]
1−α
α
− 1 ≥ n we
have that ut decreases for all t ≥ 0. If not there will exist some t > 0 such that
lt > n.
Proof of Proposition 5. 2 If γt = 0 it is easy to compute, using the proof of
theorem 4.1 that w′t = 0 and then w
c
t ≥ w′t. Now, if there is unemployment from
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proposition 3.1.1 and theorem 4.1 we have:
w∗t =
s∗t
(1− α)β ; (53)
substituting s∗t using proposition 5.1 we obtain:
w∗t =
1
(1− α)β
(1 − β)w∗tLet
Nt − Let
; (54)
and simplifying w∗t equation 54 becomes:
Let =
(1− α)β
(1− α)β + (1− β)Nt; (55)
that is,
ut =
1− β
1− αβ . (56)
From ( 22) we have:
Let =
cA
1−α
α
t wt−1L
e
t−1
[
w∗t
1−α ]
1
α
. (57)
Substituting ( 55) in ( 57), if there is unemployment in period t− 1 solving for
w∗t we obtain:
w∗t = cA
1−α
t (1− α)[
cw∗t−1Nt−1
Nt
]α = A1−αt (1 − α)[
cw∗t−1
(1 + n)
]α. (58)
Diving ( 58) by At we obtain:
w∗t
At
= (1− α)[
c
w∗t−1
At−1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]α. (59)
If we call at the equilibrium wage per unit of efficient labor ω∗t , that is, ω
∗
t =
w∗t
At
equation ( 59) becomes:
ω∗t = (1− α)[
cω∗t−1
(1 + n)(1 + g)
]α. (60)
Solving ( 60) for ω∗L−R when ω
∗
t = ω
∗
t−1 = ω
∗
L−R we obtain :
ω∗L−R = (1− α)
1
1−α (
c
(1 + n)(1 + g)
)
α
1−α . (61)
It is easy to check, drawing the phase diagram that the wage per unit of efficient
labour converges to ω∗L−R. From ( 22) we have in period zero
Le0 =
A
1−α
α
0 K0
[
w∗0
1−α ]
1
α
; (62)
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using ( 55) we have:
Le0 =
(1− α)β
(1− α)β + (1− β)N0. (63)
Substituting ( 62) in ( 63) and solving the equation for w∗0 we obtain:
w∗0 = (1− α)[
(1− α)β + (1 − β)
(1− α)β
A
1−α
α
0 K0
N0
]α, (64)
that is:
ω∗0 = (1 − α)[
(1 − α)β + (1− β)
(1− α)β
K0
A0N0
]α. (65)
From ( 53) we obtain : s∗t = β(1−α)w∗t and defining the equilibrium unem-
ployment benefit per unit of efficient labor, σ∗t , as σ
∗
t =
st
At
we also have
σ∗t = β(1− α)ω∗t . (66)
Substituting ( 58) and ( 61) in ( 66) we obtain:
σ∗t = β
(1−α)(1− α)(2−α)[ cσ
∗
t−1
(1 + n)
]α; (67)
and
σ∗L−R = β(1− α)
2−α
1−α (
c
(1 + n)
)
α
1−α . (68)
Finally, substituting ( 61) in ( 23) we obtain that y∗L−R = (1 + g)(1 + n) − 1
and the rate of growth of employment is always equal to the rate of population
growth because the rate of unemployment is constant with time.
Proof of Proposition 6. 1 We define equation 31 as F (ωt, ωt−1, ut) = 0 and
equation 32 as G(ωt, ωt−1, ut−1, ut) = 0 which implicitly define the system:
ωt = f1(ωt−1, ut−1), ut = f2(ωt−1, ut−1). Linearizing this system around the
steady state and simplifying we obtain the following jacobian matrix:
J =
"
∂f1
∂ωt−1
∂f2
∂ut−1
∂f2
∂ωt−1
∂f1
∂ut−1
#
=
24 γ+[(1−α)(1+g)−γ] 1uγ+ 1α [(1−α)(1+g)−γ] 1u −[(1−α)(1+g)−γ] ωu(1−u)γ+ 1α [(1−α)(1+g)−γ] 1u
1+α
α γ
(1−u)
ω
γ+ 1α [(1−α)(1+g)−γ] 1u
γ
γ+ 1α [(1−α)(1+g)−γ] 1u
35 .
(69)
The eigen values, λ, are obtained computing the equation det(λI − J) = 0. If
γ = (1 − α)(1 + g) then u = 1 and J =
•
1 0
0 1
‚
, which means a unique eigen
value λ = 1 and, then, the system does not converge to the steady state. If
γ < (1− α)(1 + g) then 0 < u < 1. In this case one can compute that the eigen
values will be real numbers if and only if
γ <
α
4(1 + α)
[(1− α)(1 + g)− γ] 1
u
. (70)
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If 0 < u < 1 and γ < α4(1+α) [(1 − α)(1 + g) − γ] then 70 holds. Last
inequality holds if and only if γ < α(1−α)(1+g)4+5α . If 0 < u < 1 then J =•
0 < a < 1 b < 0
c > 0 0 < d < 1
‚
. In this case the two eigen values λ1, λ2 are such
that λ1 + λ2 = a+ d > 0 and λ1λ2 = ad− bc > 0. These two inequalities imply
λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0. Now if λ1 + λ2 = a + d < 1 then we have that 0 < λ1 < 1
and 0 < λ2 < 1 which implies convergence to the steady state if both are real.
Using 69 we obtain:
λ1 + λ2 =
2γ + [(1 − α)(1 + g) − γ] 1u
γ + 1α [(1− α)(1 + g)− γ] 1u
. (71)
Using 71 we have that λ1 + λ2 < 1 if and only if:
γ <
(1− α)
α
[(1− α)(1 + g)− γ] 1
u
. (72)
If 0 < u < 1 and γ <
(1−α)
α [(1 − α)(1 + g) − γ] then 72 holds. Last inequality
holds if and only if γ < (1 − α)2(1 + g). Finally we define
γ′ = min(α(1−α)(1+g)4+5α , (1 − α)2(1 + g)).
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